The mortgage crisis: let markets work, but compensate the truly needy by William R. Emmons
R
ecent mortgage-foreclosure rates are the highest since the 
1930s.1  Yet, large-scale government interventions directly in 
housing or mortgage markets—such as government purchases of 
delinquent mortgages or vacant houses, involuntary mortgage mod-
ifications, or outright mortgage-foreclosure bans—are not necessar-
ily the best policy responses.  From the perspective of maximizing 
long-run economic efficiency, it would be better to allow housing 
and mortgage markets to sort themselves out, as painful as that may 
be.  Politicians can decide whether and how to help those who were 
made truly needy by this crisis. 
In order to minimize future boom-and-bust cycles in housing 
and mortgage markets, makers of public policy also should seek to 
eliminate risk-taking distortions that have become evident recently 
and to level the playing field for all market participants to the great-
est extent possible.
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Mortgage foreclosures had been increas-
ing gradually for many years, but they spiked 
sharply upward beginning in 2006.  Almost 
3 percent of first-lien mortgages in the U.S. 
entered the foreclosure process during 2007,  
affecting about 1.6 million households (Fig-
ure 1).
2  Conditions in housing and mortgage 
markets remain stressed in mid-2008, sug-
gesting that foreclosure rates this year could 
be even higher than last year.
3  Based on 
various data sources, mortgage-foreclosure 
rates probably have not been this high in the 
U.S. since the Great Depression during the 
early 1930s.
Among states in the Federal Reserve’s 
Eighth District, Indiana experienced the 
highest foreclosure-start rate last year (Table 
1).  About 4.34 percent of all Indiana mort-
gages entered foreclosure, representing more 
than 45,000 households.  Illinois, Mississippi 
and Kentucky also experienced foreclosure 
rates higher than the national average, while 
Tennessee, Missouri and Arkansas foreclo-
sure rates were below the national average.  
In each case, the 2007 rate was the highest for 
that state in many decades.
Causes of the Crisis
Two potential causes of debt default are an 
interruption of the borrower’s income and 
unaffordable payments.  For most house-
holds, the primary source of debt repayment 
is earnings from employment.  Becoming 
unemployed, therefore, is likely to increase 
the risk of default considerably.  A likely 
cause of unaffordable mortgage payments is 
a high interest rate on a fixed-rate mortgage 
or a high reset rate on an adjustable-rate 
mortgage.  Recent research suggests that 
neither of these factors played a large role in 
the 2006-07 increase in mortgage-foreclosure 
rates.  (See sidebar on Page 13.) 
Three important trends combined to cre-
ate the current wave of foreclosures:
1)  An increasing number of risky 
mortgages.  In 2001, fewer than 10 percent 
of outstanding mortgages were nonprime, 
a category comprising subprime and Alt-A 
(Alternative-A), or near-prime, mortgages.
4  
After losing their house to foreclosure, 
Celeste Trettin, 52, and her husband, 
Rick Trettin, 62, moved their camper 
late last year to “tent city” in Ontario, 
Calif.  They were still living there in 
March when the park was raided by 
government officials.  In an effort to 
thin the population—which had  
grown to 400 from 50 in nine months 
—officials forced those who could 
not prove their residency in Ontario 
to leave. 
On the facing page, a so-called 
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a mid-single-digit share a decade earlier.
Subprime loans are characterized by 
weaker borrowers (for example, low credit 
scores), and near-prime loans are character-
ized by riskier loan structures (for example, 
limited documentation).  Lenders attempt 
to compensate for increased risk of default 
by charging higher interest rates.  Even if the 
loan underwriting is done properly, lenders 
expect the default rate to be higher on these 
loans.  Higher interest payments by borrow-
ers who do not default are expected to offset 
the losses on defaulting loans.  Thus, higher 
default rates should be expected as the mix of 
outstanding mortgages shifts toward riskier 
categories.
2)  The riskiness of the typical nonprime 
mortgage loan increased.  There is evidence 
that the amount of risk being assumed by 
a typical nonprime borrower increased 
steadily during recent years.  One indicator 
of increasing risk is greater borrower lever-
age.  About 45 percent of subprime borrow-
ers in 2001 had less than 20 percent equity 
in their houses at the time they took out the 
mortgage.  Five years later, 58 percent were 
in this category, an increase of 13 percentage 
points.
3)  House prices stopped rising rapidly in 
2006 and began to decline in many areas.  
A common characteristic of most borrow-
ers with risky mortgages (including those 
with subprime and near-prime mortgages) is 
that their ability and willingness to remain 
current on payments is extremely sensitive 
to the rate of appreciation of their house’s 
market value.
6  As long as house prices are 
rising, even financially weak borrowers who 
are facing cash-flow problems can avoid 
default by selling the property or refinanc-
ing the mortgage.  Rising house prices create 
additional homeowners’ equity, which bails 
out both the lender and the borrower.
When house prices stop rising or actually 
fall, the sale-or-refinancing escape hatch 
begins to close.  Any financial setback can 
translate quickly into mortgage delinquency 
and, sometimes, into default.  Falling house 
prices tend to coincide with slow markets, 
when houses remain unsold for long periods 
(due to the unwillingness of many sellers to 
lower their asking prices sufficiently to meet 
the prices bid by potential buyers).  Inability 
to sell quickly increases default risk further.
Their share grew rapidly in the years that 
followed, however.  Figure 2 shows that 
subprime and near-prime mortgages reached 
almost 34 percent of all mortgage originations 
during the peak year of 2006.  After several 
years of rapid growth, about 13 percent of 
outstanding first-lien mortgage loans were 
subprime at the end of 2007, and a further 
10 percent were near-prime.
5  Thus, almost 
one-quarter of mortgages were conventional 
(not guaranteed by the federal government) 
FOReClOSuRe STARTS DuRIng 2007 In eIghTh DISTRICT STATeS
Percent of mortgages entering  
foreclosure at MBA-surveyed lenders
estimated number of mortgages  









SOuRCeS:   Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) and author’s estimates.
The estimated numbers of foreclosure starts are adjusted upward using the assumption that the numbers reported by MBA 










Foreclosure start rate (percent of mortgages
entering foreclosure; left scale)
Number of foreclosures started (millions; right scale)
































































SOuRCeS:   Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) and author’s estimates.  
Annual number of foreclosure starts is adjusted upward to reflect the partial coverage (about 84 percent) of the MBA survey.
TAble 1  
12   The Regional Economist  |  July 2008house price appreciation stalled and went 
into reverse.
8  
A Case for Correction—or Not 
From the perspective of maximizing 
long-run economic efficiency, it is better to 
allow housing and mortgage markets to sort 
themselves out as quickly as possible, rather 
than intervening to prevent house prices 
and homebuilding activity from finding 
their natural levels.  It is unlikely that any 
public policies could have prevented house 
prices from declining and many borrowers 
from defaulting during recent years, given 
the scale of apparent overvaluation and 
overbuilding in housing markets, together 
with the large number of risky mortgages 
taken on by many households.  Any delay in 
necessary adjustments would be temporary, 
at best, and could exacerbate the problems, at 
worst.  For example, artificially maintaining 
house prices at levels above those that a free-
functioning market would produce could 
induce homebuilders to continue adding to 
the supply of houses.  Ultimately, this would 
drive house prices down even further. 
A preference for nonintervention in mar-
kets does not mean that economists are heart-
less, however.  A policymaking corollary to 
the economic rule of laissez-faire in markets 
is the so-called compensation principle.
9  This 
states that a portion of the economic gains 
Nationwide average rates of house-price 
appreciation declined in 2006 and 2007 from 
double-digit rates of increase experienced 
earlier (Figure 3).  In areas that previously 
had experienced extremely rapid price 
increases, such as California and Florida, 
deceleration turned into outright price 
declines.  Among nonprime borrowers, the 
most vulnerable were those who bought their 
houses with little or no down payment or 
refinanced into a nonprime loan just before 
the house-price boom ended (2005 or 2006).  
In fact, statistical evidence shows that these 
later cohorts of borrowers are defaulting 
in large numbers now—regardless of local 
unemployment trends and often before their 
mortgage interest rates were due to reset.
7 
These three trends—a rising number of 
risky loans, increasing risk levels in these 
loans and decelerating house prices—are 
interconnected.  Increased availability 
of nonprime mortgages during the last 
decade was associated with vastly increased 
nonprime-mortgage borrowing and faster 
rates of house-price appreciation.  Rising 
house prices, in turn, encouraged more 
nonprime lending and borrowing on ever-
riskier terms—after all, loan performance 
had been good and homeowners’ equity 
appeared healthy and growing.  Unfortu-
nately, the rising tide of ever-riskier mort-
gages has unleashed a flood of defaults as 
T
he current crisis over mortgage foreclosures appears to be quite dif-
ferent from previous periods of elevated defaults, such as the 1930s, 
when unemployment reached 25 percent, or the early 1980s, when 
mortgage rates reached well into double digits.  The culprit this time appears 
to be falling house prices in many parts of the country.
The U.S. unemployment rate remained well below 5 percent during 
2006 and 2007, near the lowest levels of recent decades.  In fact, with the 
exception of the years 1998-2001, there has not been a two-year period 
with an unemployment rate as low as the 4.6 percent average of 2006  
and 2007 since the late 1960s.  Regression evidence confirms that 
instances of unemployment played a very minor role in raising foreclosure 
rates during 2006-07.
12  
Mortgage interest rates for strong borrowers (those with prime credit) 
also were historically moderate during 2006 and 2007, albeit somewhat 
higher than during 2002-05.  Interest rates did rise sharply during 2004-06 
for borrowers who took out adjustable-rate subprime mortgages and subse-
quently allowed the initial teaser rate to expire before paying off or refinanc-
ing the mortgage.  These rates did not reach the levels seen during 2000, 
however, when foreclosure rates were lower.  Moreover, most borrowers 
were able to refinance their mortgages before, or shortly after, their interest 
rates reset at a higher level.  Therefore, high mortgage rates do not appear 
to be the cause of historically high default rates during 2006 and early 2007.
Recent research points to declining house prices in many areas as a 
much more significant shock to hit vulnerable mortgage borrowers than 
either unemployment or mortgage interest rates.
13  Many subprime borrow-
ers had been able to avoid disastrous interest-rate resets on adjustable-
rate mortgages, as well as improve their stressed financial conditions, by 
liquefying the rapidly accumulating home equity that rising house prices had 
created.  But when house prices stopped rising and actually began to fall 
in many markets, the refinancing escape hatch began to close.  When sub-
prime-mortgage originations virtually ceased after the onset of financial tur-
moil in August 2007, the escape route for millions of borrowers was blocked 
completely.  In many cases, “negative equity”—mortgage debt greater than 
the market value of the house—began to grow, spurring defaults.
Unemployment and Mortgage Rates Are Not the Culprits in This Crisis
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mortgage lending coincided with, and may 
have contributed to, an increase in the 
homeownership rate.  After reaching 64.3 
percent in 1969, the homeownership rate 
fluctuated, but did not significantly surpass 
the 1969 level until 1995.  During the follow-
ing decade, as the nonprime mortgage sector 
expanded, the homeownership rate rose to 
69 percent.
Some of these new homeowners overex-
tended themselves, and abuses appear to 
have been committed by some mortgage 
brokers, other lenders, investors, apprais-
ers and others.  Oversight in the mortgage 
market should be strengthened and abuses 
eliminated, but the goal of extended access  
to mortgage credit surely is a reasonable one 
for public policy.  Because the private market 
for nonprime mortgages is not likely to 
recover quickly, there is a case for bolster-
ing government agencies and programs that 
facilitate widespread access to decent hous-
ing and mortgage credit.  These programs 
include Federal Housing Administration  
and Veterans Administration mortgage 
guarantees, as well as housing assistance 
from the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD), both for renters and 
owner-occupiers.
achieved by allowing markets to work unim-
peded can and should be used to compensate 
the losers—individuals who are harmed by 
the adjustment process itself.
In addition to compensating those 
adversely and, perhaps, unfairly affected by 
necessary market corrections, an economic 
approach to the mortgage-foreclosure crisis 
would seek to reduce or eliminate market 
distortions that may have contributed to the 
boom and bust in the first place.  The key 
underlying causes of the current spike in 
mortgage foreclosures are an increasing num-
ber of risky mortgages, greater risk-taking by 
lenders and borrowers, and a historic housing 
boom turned to bust.  Was each of these a bad 
thing by itself, needing correction?
Underlying cause No. 1—an increas-
ing number of risky mortgages.  It is not 
obvious that an increasing number of risky 
mortgages is a problem that needs to be 
fixed.  The increased number of risky mort-
gages in recent years represents an increase 
in the number of households that were able 
to access the mortgage market, as well as a 
larger variety of ways to borrow.  
In some cases, these nontraditional bor-
rowers were riskier, which resulted in higher 
expected delinquency and default rates.  
But a higher rate of default is not by itself a 




































Data are annual for 2001-2007.  The 2008 origination 
levels are annualized rates based on data for the 
first quarter of 2008.
SOuRCe:  Inside Mortgage Finance
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The financial pain suffered by mortgage 
lenders and investors is measured in the 
hundreds of billions of dollars already.  No 
doubt, investors’ appetite for making risky 
mortgage loans is much reduced today.  It is 
unlikely that as many risky mortgages will be 
offered in the future as occurred during the 
early 2000s.
Underlying cause No. 3—a historic 
housing boom turned to bust.  As is true for 
the mortgage market, housing markets also 
are most efficient when allowed to function 
unimpeded—as long as the preconditions 
for competitive markets are met, of course.  
Is the housing market capable of functioning 
efficiently?
There are potentially many buyers and 
sellers of existing houses, while the home-
building industry consists of low barriers to 
entry (and exit) and vigorous competition.  
In some communities, land-use or other 
building restrictions put artificial constraints 
on increasing the supply of housing units, 
but this means simply that house prices must 
bear more of the burden of equating supply 
and demand, rather than relying on changes 
in the housing stock.  In either type 
Underlying cause No. 2—greater risk-
taking by borrowers and lenders.  As long as 
both borrowers and lenders were fully aware 
of the greater risks they were taking, there is, 
once again, no problem to fix.  It would be 
counterproductive to ban outright any prac-
tices and contracts that well-informed buyers 
and sellers are willing to accept.  Of course, 
many mortgage borrowers probably were not 
fully informed or as sophisticated as lenders 
were.  Financial literacy desperately needs 
improvement.  Consumer-protection regula-
tions, including disclosure requirements and 
enforceable penalties that are consistently 
assessed against bad actors, are important 
in leveling the playing field.  The Federal 
Reserve actively promotes greater financial 
literacy, and the Fed has revised Regulation 
Z, which implements the Truth In Lending 
Act, to strengthen consumer protections 
in both mortgage and credit-card lending.  
In addition, more work should be done in 
strengthening enforcement mechanisms 
available to both federal and state agencies.
As for excessive risk-taking by lenders 
and investors, the best disciplining device is 
market discipline—the harsh punishment 
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closure regulations and stiffer penalties also 
are needed to reduce the information deficit 
many households suffer.
Conclusion
House prices in many parts of the country 
may fall from their peak levels in 2006 
or 2007 by the largest amount in several 
decades.  Millions of households already have 
lost their houses through foreclosure, and 
millions more probably will follow.  What 
should governments do, if anything?
From a purely economic perspective, it 
is desirable that overvalued house prices 
decline.  Artificially high house prices send 
the wrong signal to homebuilders, who will 
make the ultimate correction even worse 
by supplying even more unneeded houses.  
Foreclosures are necessary to ensure that 
mortgage markets function effectively.  The 
ability of a lender to seize the borrower’s 
collateral is what keeps a mortgage bor-
rower’s interest rate far below credit-card 
rates.  Without the possibility of foreclosure, 
mortgage rates would be much, much higher 
because the borrower’s incentive to pay back 
the loan would be diminished greatly.
The financial distress to borrowers and 
communities caused by foreclosures should 
be addressed directly.  A stronger social 
safety net—including measures such as 
income support, vouchers to guarantee 
access to decent housing and assistance in re-
establishing household financial stability—is 
the most direct way to deal with the fallout 
from mortgage foreclosures.  Local commu-
nities can be supported through direct grants 
from the federal government to replace tax 
revenue lost as a result of slumping local 
housing markets.  
Economically efficient public policy 
attacks the underlying causes of a crisis 
directly, rather than approaching problems 
indirectly or by dealing only with symptoms.   
By allowing markets to sort themselves out 
quickly, a basis for sustainable homeowner-
ship and responsible mortgage lending can be 
re-established. 
William R. Emmons is an economist at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  For more on 
Emmons’ work, see www.stlouisfed.org/banking/
PDFs/CVs/Emmons_vitae.pdf.
of market—supply-constrained or uncon-
strained—there is no compelling reason why 
market processes will produce inefficient 
outcomes.  Tax distortions may contribute to 
overinvestment in housing, but houses, once 
built, trade in relatively free markets.
The recent housing boom ranks among the 
most vigorous in recent decades, measured 
both in terms of increased home-building 
activity and house-price gains outstripping 
income growth.  The U.S. was not unique in 
this respect, as many countries experienced 
unusually large increases in both home-
building activity and house prices.
10  The 
national housing bust that is unfolding now 
is likewise large in comparison with recent 
downturns, but is unexceptional when 
compared with experiences in many other 
countries or with some prior regional hous-
ing busts in the U.S.—for example, in the 
manufacturing-intensive states in the early 
1980s, in the energy-producing states in the 
late 1980s, or in the Northeast and California 
in the early 1990s.
11 
Policy Responses
A key step in sound economic policymak-
ing is to determine if it is likely that govern-
ment actions would fix the problems.  After 
all, intervening can make the situation 
worse—for example, by distorting housing 
or mortgage markets so much that eventual 
recovery is more difficult or future perfor-
mance is compromised; by using public 
funds inefficiently and shifting the cost onto 
future taxpayers who are not represented in 
today’s debate; or by increasing moral hazard 
(the expectation of a future bailout), which 
could make future crises larger and more likely.
Based on the previous discussion of the 
underlying causes of the mortgage-foreclo-
sure crisis, the scope for welfare-enhancing 
direct interventions into housing and mort-
gage markets appears limited.  Increased gov-
ernment funding of housing and mortgage 
assistance to households not served by the 
prime mortgage market—via FHA and VA 
loan guarantees, for example—might tempo-
rarily replace some of the private nonprime 
mortgage markets that have collapsed.  A 
renewed emphasis on public-sector assis-
tance for housing and on mortgage access for 
underserved households also would address 
the presence of predatory lenders who take 
advantage of uninformed or financially 
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